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NOTE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION - DEATH KNELL OF A
GOOD SAMARITAN! - Culpepper v. Fairfield Sapphire
Valley
INTRODUCTION
A certain man went down from Jerusalem unto Jericho,
fell among thieves which stripped him of his raiment,
wounded him, and departed, leaving him half dead.'
The Good Samaritan found the injured man, bound the in-
jured man's wounds, and took the injured man to an inn.2 The
Good Samaritan went out of his way, at some cost to himself, to
help another in need of assistance.3 The story of the Good Samari-
tan formed the basis of a positive public policy doctrine appropri-
ately called the Good Samaritan Doctrine.4 The doctrine creates a
distinction between the moral duty and the legal duty to render
assistance to one in need.5 Absent a special relationship, no legal
duty exists for a person to render aid "to one for whose initial in-
jury he is not liable."6 The Good Samaritan, however, renders as-
sistance to one in need based upon his moral duty towards human-
ity, not his legal duty.7
1. Luke 10:30.
2. Luke 10:34.
3. Luke 10:35.
4. See generally 57A AM JuR 2D Negligence § 98 (2d ed. rev. 1989).
5. Annotation, Duty of One Other Than Carrier or Employer To Render As-
sistance to One for Whose Initial Injury He Is Not Liable, 33 A.L.R. 3D 301, 303
(1970).
6. Id. at 305. Situations giving rise to a special relationship include but are
not limited to the relationship between the driver and the passenger, the owner or
occupier of the premises and the invitee, the carrier and the passenger, the em-
ployer and the employee, the jailer and the prisoner, and the school and the stu-
dents. Other relationships which create a duty to render aid may depend upon
family relationships. Id.
7. Id. at 303.
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Courts have consistently struggled with the application of the
Good Samaritan Doctrine.8 In the area of Workers' Compensation,
the Good Samaritan Doctrine creates an unusual dilemma for the
employer.9 To be eligibile for Workers' Compensation benefits an
employee must be injured by an accident which arises out of and
in the course of employment.10 Compensation awards to an em-
ployee, injured while rendering assistance to a third party require
that the employee be engaged in some authorized activity calcu-
lated to further, directly or indirectly, the employer's business."
In Culpepper v. Fairfield Sapphire Valley, 2 the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals expanded the statutory definition of injury
under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. 3 The court
held compensable injuries sustained by an employee while render-
ing aid to a third party.1 4 The court reasoned that rendering aid to
8. Application of the Good Samaritan Doctrine to areas of law other than
Workers' Compensation consistently illustrates the court's struggle. See generally
Parrish v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 221 N.C. 292, 20 S.E.2d 299 (1942) (one
at fault in causing the injury of another is under a duty to mitigate that injury);
Tubbs v. Argus, 140 Ind. App. 695, 225 N.E.2d 841 (1967) (driver breached a com-
mon-law duty to render reasonable aid to passenger thereby preventing further
harm).
9. Compensation payments paid to injured employees not injured by an ac-
cident arising out of and in the course of employment defeat the legislative intent
of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. The legislative intent of the
Act does not encompass a general public insurance program for employees injured
outside the scope of their employment. At times, North Carolina courts stretch
the interpretation of the Act in order to compensate an injured employee. See
generally Watkins v. City of Wilmington, 290 N.C. 276, 255 S.E.2d 577 (1976)
(compensable injury to fireman injured during lunch while assisting a co-em-
ployee fixing his car); Brown v. Jim Brown's Serv. Station, 45 N.C. App. 255, 262
S.E.2d 700 (1980) (compensable injury to employee electrocuted while installing a
CB radio antenna in his home at his mother's direction); Lewis v. Kentucky Cen-
tral Life Insurance Co., 20 N.C. App. 247, 201 S.E.2d 228 (1973) (compensable
injury to employee struck by automobile after aiding a policyholder).
10. NC. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (1987).
11. Perry v. American Bakeries Co., 262 N.C. 272, 136 S.E.2d 643 (1964) (em-
ployee sustained a fractured cervical vertebra when he dove into an hotel pool
while at a sales meeting).
12. 93 N.C. App. 242, 377 S.E.2d 777 (1989).
13. Id. The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected the full commission's
findings of fact. By its reversing the full commission's decision, the court ex-
panded the definition of compensable injuries to include those injuries which arise
after an employee leaves work but returns to the employer's premises on a per-
sonal mission.
14. Id. at 254, 377 S.E.2d at 784.
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a third party appreciably benefitted the employer where the em-
ployer instructed the employee "to offer any assistance that [she]
could" to members and guests. 5 Prior to the Culpepper6 decision,
North Carolina courts upheld the application of the Good Samari-
tan Doctrine by denying compensation to an employee who ren-
dered assistance to a third party while acting outside the regular
duties of his employment.'
First, this Note examines the impact of the Culpepper deci-
sion on Workers' Compensation claims involving employees ren-
dering assistance to a third party.'8 Second, the Note also serves as
a caveat to employers who establish a general employee policy re-
lating to dealing with the public. Application of Culpepper to the
Good Samaritan Doctrine expands the definition of the elements
which must be met in order for an employee to be compensated for
an injury under the Workers' Compensation Act. This decision, if
upheld on appeal, seriously undermines the legislative intent of the
North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. Employers attempt-
ing to evade potential liability for accidental injuries arising from
an employee's good samaritan act will instruct their employees not
to render aid to third parties under any circumstances.
THE CASE
Fairfield Sapphire Valley, a resort community located in the
mountains of western North Carolina, employed Deborah Culpep-
15. Id. at 244, 377 S.E.2d at 779. In Defendants' brief to the North Carolina
Supreme Court, Defendants argue that the North Carolina Court of Appeals erred
when they summarily rejected the full commission's findings of fact no. 1 and
no.7. When asked how she was to supposed to "conduct [her]self with regard to
those customers that [she] served." Ms. Culpepper testifeid that "[mlost people
coming up there were looking at buying property and we were to be very cordial
and friendly and nice and offer any assistance that we could." North Carolina
Industrial Commission No. 884560, Transcript of the Evidence 5 (1987). A logical
inference, one drawn by the full commission, completes Ms. Culpepper's answer
as "we were to be very cordial and friendly and nice and offer any assistance that
we could" while on duty. Her duties included those of a waitress and bartender.
16. 93 N.C. App. 242, 377 S.E.2d 777 (1989).
17. Roberts v. Burlington Industries, 312 N.C. 350, 364 S.E.2d 417 (1988)
(upholding the Industrial Commission's denial of benefits to employee who
stopped to assist injured pedestrian while returning from business trip).
18. For purposes of this Note assume that the court of appeals decision will
be affirmed by the North Carolina Supreme Court. However, reversal of the Cul-
pepper decision will preserve the integrity of the North Carolina Workers' Com-
pensation Act and supporting case law.
1989]
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per. 9 Ms. Culpepper worked as both a waitress and a bartender.20
Her employer directed her "to be cordial at all times while on duty
since guests were prospective home buyers. ' 21 On the evening of
August 17, 1981, Deborah Culpepper completed her duties as wait-
ress at the country club at eleven p.m. 22 She drove to the Fairfield
Inn to turn in both her paperwork and her receipts.23 When Ms.
Culpepper returned to her car to leave the Fairfield Inn, Mr.
Henry, a nephew of a member, asked Ms. Culpepper for a date. 24
She refused the invitation and waited for Mr. Henry to leave the
parking lot in his car.25 Ms. Culpepper drove away from the Inn
on U.S. Highway 64 towards her home. 26 She changed her direc-
tion of travel and went back on the employer's premises for a per-
sonal mission.27
While driving on the dark, unlit, private resort road, Ms. Cul-
pepper "saw a car pulled over to the side of the road with the
19. Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 244, 377 S.E.2d at 778. The resort commu-
nity consists of two tracts of land divided by U.S. Highway 64. The facilities at
the resort include lodging, dining and recreational services for members and their
guests. Some employees reside on the premises. Private roads traverse the resort.
In addition to the private roads, the resort employs private security guards. Id.
20. Id.
21. North Carolina Industrial Commission No. 884560, Opinion and Award
for the Full Commission, Findings of Fact No. 1 (1987) (emphasis added).
22. Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 244, 377 S.E.2d at 779.
23. Id. In order to reach Fairfield Inn, Ms. Culpepper drove on both U.S.
Highway 64 and the private resort roads.
24. Id. at 244-45, 377 S.E.2d at 779. Prior to the evening of August 17, 1981,
Ms. Culpepper could only remember serving beer to Mr. Henry at the resort a few
times. Id.
25. North Carolina Industrial Commission No. 884560, Transcript of the Evi-
dence Before the full commission 10-14 (1987). According to Ms. Culpepper's tes-
timony, Mr. Henry had been sitting at the bar when she entered the Inn. After
she finished turning in her paperwork and her receipts, Ms. Culpepper went to
her car. Mr. Henry left the bar. He moved his car alongside Ms. Culpepper's car
in order to ask her for a date. Ms. Culpepper testified that the conversation took
less than five minutes. Previously, Mr. Henry had called Ms. Culpepper at work
to ask her out. She testified that she did not understand why he would not leave
her alone. Id.
26. Id. at 15. Ms. Culpepper testified that she waited for the lights of Mr.
Henry's car to disappear before she proceeded to the employees' trailers to say
good-bye to a friend. Id.
27. Id. at 47. Ms. Culpepper testified on cross that she left the Fairfield Inn
on the resort's private road, came upon U.S. Highway 64 and proceeded west, the
direction she would have taken had she not elected to return to-her employer's
property to say good-bye to a friend at a party. Id.
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flashers on and somebody in the middle of the road waving their
arms." 28 Ms. Culpepper decided to render assistance to the person
in the road whom she later recognized as Mr. Henry.29 Tragically
for Ms. Culpepper, she stopped. Mr. Henry kidnapped and raped
her.30 While trying to escape, Ms. Culpepper sustained head inju-
ries resulting in permanent partial loss of hearing, smell, and
taste."
Ms. Culpepper filed a Workers' Compensation claim with her
employer, alleging an injury by accident, arising out of and in the
course of employment.2 Deputy Commissioner McCrodden en-
tered an interlocutory opinion and award finding that Ms. Culpep-
per's job put her "at an increased risk of being confronted by male
customers. 3 3 A separate opinion and award issued by Deputy
Commissioner Burgwyn dealt with the issue of damages .3 Defend-
ants appealed the opinion and award of the deputy commissioner
to the full commission.3 5 The-full commission reviewed the case de
novo and denied compensation benefits to Ms. Culpepper.3
The commission's findings of fact no. 1 differed from the dep-
uty commissioner's findings of fact no. 1, in that the full commis-
sion found that the employer required Ms. Culpepper "to be cor-
dial at all times while on duty since guests were prospective
homebuyers."37 The deputy commissioner's findings of fact no. 1
28. Id. at 17.
29. Id.
30. Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 245, 377 S.E.2d at 779.
31. North Carolina Industrial Commission No. 884560, Transcript of the Evi-
dence Before the Full Commission 31 (1987).
32. Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 246, 377 S.E.2d at 779.
33. Id. at 246, 377 S.E.2d at 780 (emphasis in text). After issuing the interloc-
utory opinion and award, Deputy Commissioner McCrodden left the Industrial
Commission. Deputy Commissioner Burgwyn entered a separate Opinion and
award setting the amount of compensation benefits to be paid by the employer to
Ms. Culpepper. Id.
34. Id. Deputy Commissioner Burgwyn ordered the employer to pay Ms. Cul-
pepper $17,500 for her permanent injuries, temporary total disability for a two
month period at a rate of two thirds her average weekly wage, and all medical
expenses incurred for treatment of her injuries. North Carolina Industrial Com-
mission No. 884560, Opinion and Award by Henry Burgwyn, Deputy Commis-
sioner 8-9 (1987).
35. Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 246, 377 S.E.2d at 780.
36. Id. The defendants appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court on
May 18, 1989. The court certified the appeal on May 24, 1989. The appeal will be
heard later this year.
37. Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 246, 377 S.E.2d at 780 (emphasis added).
1989]
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adduced that "[i]n her service to defendant-employer's customers,
plaintiff was directed to be cordial since guests were prospective
homebuyers."38 In addition, the full commission found that Ms.
Culpepper's diversion off U.S. Highway 64 onto a private road
owned by the resort was a personal mission not connected with the
interests of her employer."9
On appeal the North Carolina Court of Appeals addressed the
issue of whether the employee's injuries arose out of and in the
course of employment. 40 Ms. Culpepper contends that she would
not have stopped but for her employer's requirement that she be
helpful and cordial to guests at all times.41 Fairfield Sapphire Val-
ley contends that Ms. Culpepper's personal mission after working
hours brought her back onto the employer's property.'2 Further-
more, no duty to the employer motivated Ms. Culpepper's actions,
rather her own moral duty as a Good Samaritan motivated her to
stop to render assistance.43 Reversing the decision of the full com-
mission, the court of appeals overturned the findings of fact no. 1
and no. 7, and held-Ms. Culpepper's injuries compensable."
BACKGROUND
A. The Purpose of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation
Act
The North Carolina Legislature enacted the Workers' Com-
pensation Act 4 in response to a need to provide compensation for
employees who suffered disability due to an accident arising out of
and in the course of employment. 46 The Act displaces common-law
38. North Carolina Industrial Commission No. 884560, Interlocutory Opinion
and Award by Deputy Commissioner Elizabeth G. McCrodden 2 (1985).
39. North Carolina Industrial Commission No. 884560, Opinion and Award
for the Full Commission, Findings of Fact No. 7 (1987).
40. Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 244, 377 S.E.2d at 778.
41. Id. at 248, 377 S.E.2d at 781.
42. Id. at 250-51, 377 S.E.2d at 782-83.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 250-51, 377 S.E.2d at 781-84.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97 (1979). The North Carolina Workers' Compensation
Act is codified under Chapter 97 of the General Statutes. Section 97-1 sets forth
the name and purpose of the Act. Section 97-2(6) outlines the definitional ele-
ments of compensability for an injury.
46. Henry v. A.C. Lawrence Leather Co., 234 N.C. 126, 128, 66 S.E.2d 693,
694 (1951) (interpreting the Act to find a compensable accident when an em-
ployee suffered from tenosynovitis caused from repetitive motion trauma to
[Vol. 12:121
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or statutory causes of action and other grounds of liability."7 The
Act not only provides a swift remedy for an injured employee, it
also limits the employer's liability for compensable injuries.4
The sole basis of liability of the employer rests on the require-
ment that the injury must be by accident and arise out of and in
the course of employment. "' The Workers' Compensation Act de-
mands that the Act be liberally construed in order to provide com-
pensation for injured employees.50 However, the courts may not ex-
pand liability of the employer under the guise of liberal
construction. 1
B. Compensability Under the Act
When the employer employs the requisite number of employ-
ees, the Workers' Compensation Act applies to every employee.2
However, for an injury to be compensable it must be ". . . an injury
by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment,
elbows); Rorie v. Holly Farms Poultry Co., 306 N.C. 706, 295 S.E.2d 458 (1982)
(no accident under the Act when an employee stabbed to death in employer's
parking lot by fellow employee).
47. Branham v. Denny Roll & Panel Co., 223 N.C. 233, 25 S.E.2d 865 (1943).
The general purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act, in respect to compensa-
tion for disability, is to substitute, for common-law or statutory rights of action
and grounds of liability, a system of money payments by way of financial relief for
loss of capacity to earn wages. There is no compensation provided for physical
pain and discomfort. Id. at 236, 25 S.E.2d at 867.
48. Taylor v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 57 N.C. App. 643, 292 S.E.2d 277 (1982),
modified and aff'd, 307 N.C. 392, 298 S.E.2d 681 (1983). "The purpose of the Act,
however, is not only to provide a swift and certain remedy to an injured workman,
but also to insure a limited and determinate liability for employers." Id. at 644-
45, 292 S.E.2d at 279 (quoting Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, 427,
146 S.E.2d 479, 484 (1966)).
49. Conrad v. Cook Lewis Foundry, Co., 198 N.C. 723, 725-26, 153 S.E. 266
(1930) (holding that absent willful intention to injure, the injury arose out of and
in the course of employment where employee hit fellow employee with a shovel).
50. Keller v. Electric Wiring Co., 259 N.C. 222, 130 S.E.2d 342 (1963) (em-
ployee ruptured disc when lifting rock out of ditch he was digging for his em-
ployer). The court held that the "Act requires that it be liberally construed to
effectuate the objects for which it was passed - to provide compensation for
workers injured in industrial accidents." Id. at 225, 130 S.E.2d at 344.
51. Rorie v. Holly Farms Poultry Co., 306 N.C. 706, 295 S.E.2d 458 (1982)
(death held not compensable where employee stabbed fellow employee in em-
ployer's parking lot).
52. Pilley v. Greenville Cotton Mills, 201 N.C. 426, 160 S.E. 479 (1931). Cur-
rently, the requisite number of regular employees is three. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2
(1979 & Supp. 1988).
1989]
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ment, and shall not include a disease in any form, except where it
results naturally and unavoidably from the accident." 3 The bur-
den of proof rests with the injured employee .5 The employee must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury arose by
accident, that the injury arose out of and in the course of employ-
ment, and that the injury caused the incapacity for which the em-
ployee seeks compensation.5
C. The Accident Requirement
The Workers' Compensation Act defines accident as "(1) an
unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or
designed by the injured employee; (2) a result produced by a fortu-
itous cause." ' In addition, an accident must have its origin in a
risk connected with the employment and be a risk to which the
general public is not equally exposed.5 7
An assault may be an accident. 8 Specifically, assaults have
been held to be compensable when they are "unexpected and with-
out design on the part of the employee who suffers from it."' 59 In
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (1979).
54. Henry v. A.C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 57 S.E.2d 760 (1950)
(employee failed to prove that his injury brought him under the auspices of the
act); O'Mary v. Land Clearing Corp., 261 N.C. 508, 135 S.E.2d 193 (1964) (em-
ployee bears the burden of proof that he sustained an injury arising out of and in
the course of employment); Priddy v. Cone Mills Corp., 58 N.C. App. 720, 294
S.E.2d 743 (1982) (employee must prove that his injury caused his inability to
work).
55. Hollman v. City of Raleigh, 273 N.C. 240, 159 S.E.2d 874 (1968). To ob-
tain compensation under the Act, the employee must show that "his injury caused
his disability, 'unless it is included in the schedule of injuries made compensable
by G.S. § 97-31 without regard to loss of wage-earning power.'" Id. at 250, 159
S.E.2d at 881 (quoting Anderson v. Northwestern Motor Co., 233'N.C. 372, 374,
64 S.E.2d 265, 266 (1951).
56. O'Mary v. Land Clearing Corp., 261 N.C. 508, 510, 135 S.E.2d 193, 195
(1964) (construction employee suffered amputation of toe due to blister received
during course of employment). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (1979).
57. Pittman v. Twin City Laundry & Cleaners, 61 N.C. App. 468, 300 S.E.2d
899 (1983)(death held compensable where employee, who had been drinking while
working, was shot to death by fellow employee on employer's premises while
working after employee's normal hours).
58. Gallimore v. Marilyn's Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 233 S.E.2d 529 (1977) (claim
held not compensable where employee completed her work day and went to her
car parked in the mall parking lot where she was abducted and killed).
59. Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 238, 188 S.E.2d 350, 355 (1972).
(deaths held not to have arisen out of and in the course of employment where
[Vol. 12:121
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Gallimore v. Marilyn's Shoes,60 the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that "assault" meets the definitional requirement of accident
under the Workers' Compensation Act.61
D. Arising Out of Employment
1. Causal Relationship
For an injury to arise out of the employment, the injury must
occur while the employee performs some activity or duty, calcu-
lated to directly or indirectly further the employer's business.62 In
Hoyle v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 3 the North Carolina Supreme
Court held the "employee's election to disobey a prior given order
did not break the causal connection between his employment and
his fatal injury if the disobedient act was reasonably related to the
accomplishment of the task for which he was hired. '64  On the
night of Hoyle's accident, the forklift operator was busy helping
another employee.6 5 Hoyle, faced with the choice of remaining idle
in compliance with a rule or continuing to further his employer's
business, chose to operate the forklift.66
Chief Justice Branch explained that the employer would have
benefitted from those acts had the deceased employee successfully
completed operating the forklift.67 Furthermore, "engaging in an
activity which is outside the narrow confines of the employee's job
description, but which is reasonably related to the accomplishment
of the task for which the employee was hired, does not ordinarily
constitute a departure from the scope of employment." '
2. Increased Risk
The test to determine if an accidental injury arises out of the
employment asks whether the risk was incident to the employment
jealous husband shot wife and co-employee at work).
60. 292 N.C. 399, 233 S.E.2d 529 (1977)
61. Id. at 292, 233 S.E.2d at 530.
62. Hoyle v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co.,. 306 N.C. 248, 293 S.E.2d 196 (1982)
(claim held compensable where employer had rule against unauthorized personnel
operating forklifts and employee died when the forklift he was not authorized to
operate overturned and pinned him under it).
63. Id. at 259, 293 S.E.2d at 203.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 250, 293 S.E.2d at 197.
66. Id. at 259, 293 S.E.2d at 203.
67. Id.
68. Id.
1989]
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and one to which the general public is not equally exposed. 9 In
1977 the North Carolina Supreme Court held in Gallimore that the
death of an employee, kidnapped, robbed and killed in a mall
parking lot after work, did not arise out of her employment.7"
Marilyn's Shoes employed Miss Gallimore as a clerk.71 She sold
merchandise, made sales reports and prepared deposits for the
bank. 71 On the evening of November 3, 1972 at 6 p.m., Miss Gal-
limore completed her day's work and proceeded towards her car in
the mall parking lot.73 In the mall parking lot, two men kidnapped,
robbed and killed Miss Gallimore.7 '
The full commission, viewing the case as a premises case, held
the death compensable since, in the commission's view, it arose out
of and in the course of employment. 75 The court of appeals af-
firmed with one dissent.76 On appeal to the North Carolina Su-
preme Court, in the opinion written by Justice Moore, the court
held that "the risk of the assault upon Miss Gallimore was essen-
tially one common to the neighborhood, not peculiar to the em-
ployment, and one which could happen to anyone who patronizes a
shopping mall. '77
3. Good Samaritan Acts
Good Samaritan Acts by employees may be categorized as (1)
acts benefitting co-employees,78 (2) acts benefitting strangers,79 or
(3) acts benefitting customers.80 According to Larson, compen-
69. Fortner v. J.K. Holding Co., 83 N.C. App. 101, 349 S.E.2d 296 (1986) (risk
of injury held not different from one to which the general public is equally ex-
posed where employee injured when she fell off chair at home while hanging
plants her employer asked her to dispose).
70. Gallimore, 292 N.C. at 406, 233 S.E.2d at 533.
71. Id. at 400, 233 S.E.2d at 530.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 401, 233 S.E.2d at 530.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 401, 233 S.E.2d at 531 (commission held that the mall parking lot
came under the auspices of the employer's premises).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 405, 233 S.E.2d at 533.
78. Watkins v. City of Wilmington, 290 N.C. 276, 225 S.E.2d 577 (1976) (acts
held compensable where fireman injured while assisting co-employee with minor
car repairs because such repairs during lunch hour were reasonable for fireman on
a 24 hour shift).
79. Roberts v. Burlington Industries, 321 N.C. 350, 364 S.E.2d 417 (1988).
80. 1 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 27.20, at 5-225 (1989)
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sability requires that the ultimate effect of the Good Samaritan's
acts advance the employer's work.s" Larson groups acts benefitting
customers and acts benefitting strangers together.82 North Carolina
makes a distinction between acts benefitting strangers and acts
benefitting customers.8 3
In 1955 the North Carolina Supreme Court in Guest v. Bren-
ner Iron & Metal Co. 4 addressed the problem of an employee who
during the course of employment, rendered aid to a stranger at a
time when mutual aid was being exchanged. 5 At the direction of
his employer, Willie Guest drove to the airport to change two flat
tires on the company truck.86 This task required Mr. Guest to in-
flate the tires at a service station. Mr. Guest asked the attendant
"for permission to use his air hose to inflate the tires."88 As a recip-
rocal favor to the attendant, Mr. Guest assisted the attendant in
pushing a customer's disabled car away from the gas pumps.8 9
While pushing the customer's car, another car crashed into the
rear of the car being pushed, seriously injuring Mr. Guest. 0
The supreme court held the injury compensable.9' The court
reasoned that the employee "had reasonable grounds to believe
that what he was doing was incidental to his employment and ben-
eficial to his employer and that, if his employer had been there, he
would have instructed plaintiff to render such reciprocal
assistance." 2
In 1973 the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Lewis v. Ken-
tucky Central Life Insurance Co.93 held compensable injuries sus-
[hereinafter LARSON]. For purposes of this Note, the acts benefitting strangers
and the acts benefitting customers shall be explored.
81. Id. § 27.21 at 5-225.
82. Id. § 27.20 at 5-225.
83. North Carolina has held compensable good samaritan acts by an em-
ployee for a policy holder, while denying compensation for Good Samaritan acts
by an employee for a stranger. See Roberts, 321 N.C. 350, 364 S.E.2d 417; Guest
v. Brennor Iron & Metal Co., 241 N.C. 448, 85 S.E.2d 596 (1955).
84. 241 N.C. 448, 85 S.E.2d 596 (1955).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 450, 85 S.E.2d at 598.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 455, 85 S.E.2d at 601.
92. Id. at 453, 85 S.E.2d at 600.
93. 20 N.C. App. 247, 201 S.E.2d 228 (1973).
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tained by an insurance salesman as he returned to his car after
rendering aid to policyholders." In Lewis, the court held that the
employee acted not only "to an appreciable extent, but also to a
substantial extent, for the benefit of his employer."' 5
The premier case on good samaritan acts in North Carolina is
Roberts v. Burlington Industries.' In Roberts, an out-of-control
car killed an employee, as he assisted an injured pedestrian. At
the time of the accident the employee was returning from a busi-
ness trip." The employee's acts and the name of his employer re-
ceived some attention from the media. 9 The full commission
found that the employee rendered aid to an apparent stranger.1 0
Furthermore, the employee's benevolent acts had no rational rela-
tionship to his duties as a furniture designer for the employer.101
The full commission denied compensation.102
The court of appeals applied the "positional risk" doctrine.103
The positional risk doctrine holds that "[a]n injury arises out of
the employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact that
the conditions and obligations of employment placed claimant in
the position where he was injured."10' The court of appeals deter-
mined that the employee died in an accident while returning from
a business trip. 0 5 Therefore, the conditions of employment placed
the employee in the dangerous position which resulted in death. 06
The court of appeals held the injury compensable. 10 7
Recognizing the legislative intent of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, the North Carolina Supreme Court held the claim not
94. Id.
95. Id. at 250, 201 S.E.2d at 230. The court reasoned that an insurance
salesman's responsibilities include continual communications with the policyhold-
ers. Therefore, by the very nature of his employment any "action on his part
which built good will for him at the same time fostered goodwill for his em-
ployer." Id.
96. 321 N.C. 350, 364 S.E.2d 417 (1988).
97. Id. at 350, 364 S.E.2d at 418.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 351, 364 S.E.2d at 419.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 358, 364 S.E.2d at 423.
104. LARSON, supra note 80, § 6.50 at 3-6.
105. Roberts, 86 N.C. App. 126, 356 S.E.2d 794 (1987).
106. Roberts, 321 N.C. at 353-54, 364 S.E.2d at 420.
107. Id. at 353, 364 S.E.2d at 420.
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compensable. 0 8 The court declined to adopt the lower court's use
of the positional risk doctrine. 0 9 Under the court's rationale, the
employee stopped to render aid as a Good Samaritan, not as an
employee.110 Furthermore, the court reasoned that to "grant com-
pensation here would effectively remove the 'arising out of the em-
ployment' requirement from the Act.""'
E. In the Course of Employment
In Guest, the court held that "in the course of employment"
refers to the time, place and circumstances under which the injury
occurs." 2 Each of these requirements depend upon the other." 3
Each requirement must be satisfied." 4
First, the accident must occur during the hours of employ-
ment."' The time requirement includes a reasonable time before
work begins and a reasonable time after work ends."' Further-
more, time contemplates intervals during the work day for rest and
refreshment." 7 Second, the accident must occur at the place of
employment." 8
"[Als a general rule, employment may be said to begin when
the employee reaches the entrance to the employer's premises
where the work is to be done; but it is clear that in some cases the
rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee
as a means of ingress and egress with the express or implied con-
sent of the employer.""' 9
Third, the accident must occur during the employee's perform-
108. Roberts, 321 N.C. at 359, 364 S.E.2d at 422-23.
109. Id. at 358, 364 S.E.2d at 423.
110. Id. at 357, 364 S.E.2d at 422.
111. Id. at 360, 364 S.E.2d at 424.
112. Guest, 241 N.C. at 451, 85 S.E.2d at 600.
113. Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C. App. 448, 162 S.E.2d 47, (1968) (employee did
not suffer compensable injury when her car collided with another employee's car
in employer's parking lot during lunch).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 455, 162 S.E.2d at 52.
116. Id. at 456, 162 S.E.2d at 52.
117. Rewis v. New York Life Insurance Co., 226 N.C. 325, 38 S.E.2d 97 (1946)
(death held compensable where employee fell through open window).
118. Harless, 1 N.C. App. at 456, 162 S.E.2d at 53.
119. Bass v. Mecklenburg County, 258 N.C. 226, 233, 128 S.E.2d 570, 575
(1962) (quoting Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 158 (1927)).
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ance of the duties of employment. 120 The circumstances require-
ment includes a reasonable time for coming and going from work,
as well as a reasonable time for activities authorized by the em-
ployer.121 All three factors, time, place and circumstance, must be
met in order to find that an injury arose in the course of
employment. 122
ANALYSIS
In Culpepper, the North Carolina Court of Appeals deter-
mined that Ms. Culpepper's injuries arose out of and in the course
of her employment.123 The court reasoned: first, the injuries were
causally connected to her employment;' 2" second, the nature of her
job increased the risk of sexual assault;125 third, Ms. Culpepper's
act of stopping to assist a guest was of appreciable benefit to her
employer. 126
In its decision, the Culpepper Court ignored two critical areas
of Workers' Compensation law. First, the court sua sponte dis-
missed the findings of fact. 2 ' Second, the court effectively elimi-
nated the application of Roberts to situations involving an em-
ployee who renders assistance to a third party. 2 8
A. Causal Connection to Employment
According to the court of appeals, the only reason Ms. Cul-
pepper stopped to render assistance on the resort road "was to of-
fer a guest assistance, as her employer instructed her to do."' 12 9 The
court reasoned, incredibly, that Ms. Culpepper's employer would
have wanted her to stop on a dark, deserted resort road at mid-
night to assist potential homebuyers.' 30
120. Harless, 1 N.C. App. at 456, 162 S.E.2d at 53.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 457, 162 S.E.2d at 53.
123. Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 254, 377 S.E.2d at 784. The injury by acci-
dent requirement was met under Gallimore, which supports the theory that an
assault is unexpected and without design on the part of the employee who suffers
from it. Id. at 247, 377 S.E.2d at 780.
124. Id. at 254, 377 S.E.2d at 784.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 249, 377 S.E.2d at 781.
128. Id. at 251, 377 S.E.2d at 782.
129. Id. at 248, 377 S.E.2d at 781 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 249, 377 S.E.2d at 781.
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The court's premise disregards a common sense approach to
the facts. First, potential homebuyers do not tour the premises on
the resort's private roads at midnight. Second, no employer ex-
pects a lone woman to aid a stranger at midnight on a deserted
road. Third, the employer directed, and Ms. Culpepper testified,
that she should conduct herself in a cordial and friendly manner
while performing her duties as waitress or bartender.13 ' At no time
did the employer direct Ms. Culpepper to assist stranded motorists
or guests on the premises, especially at midnight.3 2 Furthermore,
stopping at midnight on a dark, deserted resort road bears no ra-
tional relationship to the duties of a waitress or bartender contem-
plated by the employment contract.
The court relied on Lewis v. Kentucky Central Life Ins. Co. 1.3
in its determination of causal relationship.' 3 Clearly, Lewis may
be distinguised from Culpepper in two ways. First, in Lewis the
duties of employment included extensive traveling. 35 As a sales-
man and debit insurance collector, the employee drove his own
car. 13 The insurance company maintained no office in the em-
ployee's county of residence. 37 Therefore, the car and highways of
the sales area represented Mr. Lewis' workplace. On the other
hand, Ms. Culpepper's duties of employment did not require the
use of her car as a prerequisite to her duties as a waitress and bar-
tender. She only drove her car to and from work. 13 Therefore,
driving her car on the evening of the assault did not represent any
rational relationship to her employment duties, only to her em-
ployment destination.
Second, Mr. Lewis served as a roving ambassador for the in-
surance company.' 39 Any goodwill he created with customers or po-
131. Id. at 244, 377 S.E.2d at 779.
132. North Carolina Industrial Commission No. 884560, Transcript of the
Evidence Before the Full Commission (1987). No evidence exists in the transcript
of evidence which indicates Ms. Culpepper's duties included anything other than
those duties as waitress or bartender. At no time did she perform any duties
outside those of waitress and bartender. Id.
133. 20 N.C. App. 247, 201 S.E.2d 228 (1973). See supra notes 93-95.
134. Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 251, 377 S.E.2d at 782.
135. Lewis, 20 N.C. App. at 248, 201 S.E.2d at 229.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. North Carolina Industrial Commission No. 884560, Transcript of the
Evidence 40 (1987). Ms. Culpepper lived about five miles west of Fairfield.
139. Lewis, 20 N.C App. at 251, 201 S.E.2d at 231.
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tential customers created goodwill for his employer.'4 0 Therefore, a
benefit inured to the insurance company when Mr. Lewis stopped
to aid a policyholder stranded on the highway.14' Ms. Culpepper,
however, did not travel about the resort serving food and drinks.
The employer benefitted from her cordiality while she served food
and liquor at the country club. 1 2 Once Ms. Culpepper completed
her duties each day her responsibility as a goodwill ambassador for
the resort ended.
B. Increased Risk
The employer contends that a personal motive prompted Mr.
Henry's assault and that the employee "faced no greater risk of
sexual assault than any other citizen.' 143 However, the Culpepper
Court held that employment as a waitress and bartender placed
one at an increased risk of sexual assault not shared by the general
public." According to the court, Ms. Culpepper fit into this cate-
gory. 14 5 The court reasoned that the nature of the job (1) subjected
the employee to unwelcome male advances, (2) required the em-
ployee to work late at night, and (3) caused the employee to "serve
alcoholic beverages to a variety of people, some of whom might be
intoxicated." 1 4
Support for the majority's opinion came from cases outside
North Carolina. When examined closely, these cases are clearly
distinguishable from the Culpepper case. 1 7 On the other hand, in
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. North Carolina Industrial Commission No. 884560, Transcript of the
Evidence 4 (1987).
143. Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 249, 377 S.E.2d at 781.
144. Id. at 249-50, 377 S.E.2d at 782.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. The court cited to Orr v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 335, 627
P.2d 1193 (1981), aff'd, 230 Kan. 271, 634 P.2d 1067 (1981) (cocktail waitress as-
saulted in restroom during middle of her shift on employer's premises suffered
compensable injury); Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Marin, 488 S.W.2d 861
(Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (employee raped and murdered as she was opening em-
ployer's premises for the day suffered compensable injury); Employers Ins. Co. v.
Wright, 108 Ga. App. 380, 133 S.E.2d 39 (1963) (employee raped at gunpoint by
purported customer on employer's premises suffered compensable injury);
Giracelli v. Franklin Cleaners & Dyers, 132 N.J. L. 590, 42 A.2d 3 (1945) (dry
cleaning sales clerk raped during hours of employment on employer's premises
suffered compensable injury); Zahn v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 655 S.W.2d
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1977 the North Carolina Supreme Court denied compensation to
an employee assaulted on the employer's premises while leaving
work.148 Review of the case reveals facts similar to the facts in Cul-
pepper. Two men assaulted, robbed and killed Ms. Gallimore as
she approached her car after work. 4 9 Her employer rented space in
a shopping mall. 5 While working, Ms. Gallimore parked in the
mall parking lot.' 5 ' Had the court of appeals correctly analyzed
North Carolina case law, it would have found the precedential
value of Gallimore.
North Carolina requires that the risk must be incident to the
employment and not a risk common to the general public.5 2 The
court expressed male bias when it took judicial notice that the na-
ture of Ms. Culpepper's employment increased the risk of sexual
assault. The court fails to present empirical data to support its
opinion. In our society some males subject females to unwelcome
advances. 53 Those who work in the service industries, and thus
deal with the public, do not subject themselves to any greater risk
of unwelcome male advances than do women who frequent bars,
walk down streets, or visit shopping malls. The court's argument
on the increased risk of exposure to unwelcome advances fails since
it is a risk common to the general public.
Assuming Mr. Henry's intoxication created a motive for the
assault on Ms. Culpepper, the court's argument would fail since
intoxication is a risk common to the general public. However, no
evidence exists on the record establishing Mr. Henry's intoxication
769 (Mo. App. 1983) (Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's dis-
missal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court indicated that an em-
ployee, who went shopping for twenty minutes after work and was later assaulted
and raped in the parking garage adjacent to the employer's premises, suffered a
compensable injury under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Act.); Bunny
Bread v. Shipman, 267 Ark. 926, 591 S.W.2d 692 (1979) (bread deliveryman in-
jured while on his route when he stopped to aid stranded motorist suffered com-
pensable injury).
148. Gallimore, 292 N.C. 399, 233 S.E.2d 529 (employer's premises included
mall parking lots).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 401, 233 S.E.2d at 531.
152. Robbins, 281 N.C. 234, 188 S.E.2d 350.
153. Women are whistled at while walking down the street, honked at while
driving or walking, approached in various situations when a man wants to get the
woman's attention. Increasingly, with the continued evolution of women's asser-
tiveness, men are subjected to whistles, honks and pickups by women.
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as a motivation for the assault. Therefore, intoxication reflects a
moot issue as to the assault on Ms. Culpepper.
The court determined that employees who work late at night
may be at a greater risk of assault than those who don't work late
at night. 54 Ms. Culpepper safely reached her car. 155 While heading
homewards, she diverted back onto the employer's property on a
personal mission. 56 In the course of her midnight personal mis-
sion, she stopped to render aid to a stranger on a dark, deserted
resort road.1 57 Ms. Culpepper's attacker did not pull her car over to
the side of the road. On the contrary, her assault resulted from her
good samaritan act, not as a result of working late.' 58 The fact that
Ms. Culpepper drove to a party after she finished work created no
special risk incident to her employment. Ms. Culpepper would
have driven down that same resort road to attend the party re-
gardless of whether she had worked that night.
C. Good Samaritan Acts - The Appreciable Benefits Test
The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that Ms. Culpep-
per's acts appreciably benefitted the employer.'5 9 The court curso-
rily applied Guest and Lewis to determine that stopping to assist a
guest bore a clear relation to her employer's interests.6 0 The court
gave credence to the fact that Ms. Culpepper recognized Mr.
Henry prior to deciding to stop to render assistance. 61 However,
the evidence supports a contrary conclusion. Ms. Culpepper did
not know whose vehicle obstructed the road.' Not until Ms. Cul-
pepper had decided to stop did she recognize the alleged stranded
motorist as Mr. Henry. 63
As discussed above, Lewis is clearly distinguishable from the
154. Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 249-50, 377 S.E.2d at 782.
155. Id. at 244-45, 377 S.E.2d at 779.
156. Id. at 245, 377 S.E.2d at 779.
157. Id.
158. If Ms. Culpepper had continued on her route home, Mr. Henry would
have remained on the dark, deserted resort road. No contact with Ms. Culpepper
would have occurred that evening.
159. Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 251, 377 S.E.2d at 783.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. North Carolina Industrial Commission No. 884560, Transcript of the
Evidence 17 (1987). Ms. Culpepper testified "I saw a car pulled over to the side of
the road with the flashers on and somebody in the middle of the road waving
their arms." When asked who the person was, she responded, "I wasn't sure." Id.
163. Id.
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facts in Culpepper. In Lewis the employee assisted a known cus-
tomer. 64 The employer was clearly benefitted. 65 Guest presented
a similar fact pattern.'66 In Guest, the employee, while executing
his duties of employment, exchanged reciprocal favors which
clearly benefitted the employer. 67 The employee's acts in Guest,
while not benefitting a customer, did benefit the employer's
interests.' 68
The Culpepper Court erred by failing to apply Roberts.'69 The
Roberts Court found that the employee acted solely as a Good Sa-
maritan.17 0 While driving home from a business trip, the employee
stopped to render aid.' 7 ' The court stated that no benefit accrued
to the employer as a result of the employee's good samaritan act. 72
Ms. Culpepper, too, acted solely as a Good Samaritan. While driv-
ing home from work, she stopped to render aid.173 No benefit
would accrue to her employer as a result of her good deed at mid-
night. The likelihood that a prospective homebuyer traversed the
darkened roads at midnight was remote. Compensability should be
denied because the worker was off work, on her way home and her
rendering aid was done because she was a Good Samaritan, not
because she worked for Fairfield Sapphire Valley. She would have
stopped regardless for whom she worked.
The court's decision in Culpepper sounds the death knell for
good samaritans in North Carolina. Employers, attempting to limit
their potential liability under the Workers' Compensation Act, will
instruct employees not to render aid to those in need while coming
and going to work or during their hours of employment. 74 Public
policy will be thwarted, through the employer's discouragement of
good samaritan acts by its employees.
The court failed to closely examine the evidence. In its effort
to compensate a victim, the court failed to maintain the integrity
164. Lewis, 20 N.C. App. at 249, 201 S.E.2d at 229.
165. Id. at 250, 201 S.E.2d at 230.
166. Guest, 241 N.C. 448, 85 S.E.2d 596.
167. Id. at 453, 85 S.E.2d at 600.
168. Id. at 454, 85 S.E.2d at 600.
169. 321 N.C. 350, 364 S.E.2d 417.
170. Id. at 355, 364 S.E.2d at 421.
171. Id. at 351, 364 S.E.2d at 419.
172. Id. at 356-57, 364 S.E.2d at 422.
173. Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 245, 377 S.E.2d at 779.
174. This would be a natural consequence of the Culpepper decision. Pres-
sure from the insurance companies would require the employers to impose strict
guidelines to limit liability in order to maintain Workers' Compensation coverage.
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of the Workers' Compensation Act. The court erred in holding Ms.
Culpepper's injuries compensable. Her injuries stemmed from her
good samaritan acts, not from her employment.
D. Dismissal of the Full Commission's Findings of Fact
Findings of fact by the full commission are conclusive if sup-
ported by competent evidence. 75 This requirement demands that
the reviewing court uphold the findings of fact when they are sup-
ported by competent evidence.17 Furthermore, if the inferences
from the evidence "appear equally plausible," affording an alterna-
tive interpretation, the reviewing court may not reweigh the evi-
dence and set aside the findings of fact.'7
The Culpepper Court defied a basic premise of the Workers'
Compensation Act by setting aside two important findings of
fact.178 The full commission, on de novo review, found in findings
of fact no. 1 that "Ms. Culpepper was told to be helpful and cor-
dial to guests only while on duty.' 79 The transcript of the evi-
dence supports the permissible inferences drawn by the full com-
mission, the trier of fact.180
During direct examination, Mr. Justice, attorney for Ms. Cul-
pepper, asked her if she had "occasion during the course of that
employment [at Fairfield Sapphire Valley] to receive any instruc-
tions from [her] employer as to how [she was] to conduct [her]self
with regard to those customers that [she] served?"' 8' Ms. Culpep-
per testified that "[m]ost of the people coming up there were look-
ing at buying property and we were to be very cordial and friendly
and nice and offer any assistance that we could."'82 The full com-
175. Blalock v. Roberts Co., 12 N.C. App. 499, 183 S.E.2d 827 (1971) (em-
ployee sought compensation for loss of leg).
176. Id.
177. Rewis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 226 N.C. 325, 38 S.E.2d 97 (1946).
178. Under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, the full commis-
sion's findings of fact, when supported by competent evidence in the record are
conclusive, even if the record also supports a contrary finding. Blalock, 12 N.C.
App. at 504, 183 S.E.2d at 830.
179. Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 249, 377 S.E.2d at 781 (emphasis in text).
180. The transcript of the evidence clearly supports the full commission's in-
ferences that Ms. Culpepper's cordiality extended only to her duties as waitress
and bartender. The court of appeals is barred from asserting otherwise under the
Act. Blalock, 12 N.C. App. at 504, 183 S.E.2d at 830.
181. North Carolina Industrial Commission File No. 884560, Transcript of
the Evidence 4-5 (1987).
182. Id. at 5.
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mission inferred from that testimony that Ms. Culpepper's duties
required her to conduct herself in a cordial and helpful manner
while performing her duties as waitress and bartender. 183 This re-
quirement of cordiality of her employment ceased when she was
not on duty.
The court concluded upon review of findings of fact no. 7 that
Ms. Culpepper "was engaged in a work-related activity reasonably
calculated to benefit her employer." 18' However, the full commis-
sion, based upon competent evidence in the record, found that Ms.
Culpepper's "diversion off of [U.S. Highway 64] into the private
road owned by the resort community was for a mission and pur-
pose which was personal to her and not connected with the inter-
ests of her employer.' '185
On cross examination Mr. Russell asked Ms. Culpepper,
"[W]hen you turned in your paperwork and the Xerox copy at the
front desk having already turned in the money, you had then com-
pleted your work responsibilities for that evening at Fairfield?"' 6
Ms. Culpepper responded "Yes, sir.' 87 Mr. Russell inquired,
"[W]hen you then departed the Fairfield Inn and started back out
to your car, you were going to your car for the purpose of getting in
it and then going wherever it was that you elected to go?" '188 Ms.
Culpepper responded, "Yes, sir."189
Based upon Ms. Culpepper's own testimony, the full commis-
sion found that Ms. Culpepper "was acting on a personal mission
in going to the farewell party for a fellow employee and was not
under any employment duty to travel upon that road or to stop to
assist anyone being located on that road. Consequently her injury
by accident did not arise out of her employment with defendant
employer."' 90
In his dissent, Judge Greene correctly targets a flaw in the ma-
183. Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 246, 377 S.E.2d at 780.
184. Id. at 254, 377 S.E.2d at 784.
185. North Carolina Industrial Commission No. 884560, Opinion and Award
for the Full Commission 3 (1987).
186. North Carolina Industrial Commission No. 884560, Transcript of the
Evidence 44 (1987).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. North Carolina Industrial Commission No. 884560, Opinion and Award
for the Full Commission 3 (1987).
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jority's rationale.191 According to Judge Greene, the full commis-
sion's findings of fact no. 1 clearly characterized the scope of em-
ployment. 92 Furthermore, the majority of the court made an
incorrect determination that findings of fact no. 1 was not sup-
ported by the evidence. 9" Judge Greene stated that "[t]here is suf-
ficient evidence in the record from which the Commission could
have drawn reasonable inferences to support Finding No. 1. ' 1 94
Under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act § 97-1,
the findings of fact of the industrial commission are conclusive on
appeal if supported by competent evidence, even though the evi-
dence may support a different conclusion.19 In Blalock the court
held that the commission had "the duty and authority to resolve
conflicts in the testimony." 196 However, the Culpepper Court sum-
marily dismissed the full commission's findings of fact.1 97 Clearly,
Judge Greene's dissent points towards a more consistent holding
under the requirements of the Act.
E. Time, Place, Circumstance
Reviewing the time, place, and circumstance requirements, the
court held first, that "the time elapse did not exceed a reasonable
time in which to leave work;"' 98 second, that U.S. Highway 64 for
purposes of the "going and coming rule" constituted the em-
ployer's premises;19 9 third, that the reason Ms. Culpepper stopped
on the private road was incidental to her employment, even though
she drove on the private road for a personal mission;"' and fourth,
that stopping to assist a guest placed Ms. Culpepper in a work-
related activity "reasonably caculated to benefit her employer"
even though Ms. Culpepper had completed her work for the day.2 01
The court held that the "time elapse did not exceed a reasona-
191. Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 255, 377 S.E.2d at 785 (Green, J.,
dissenting).
192. Id.
193. Id, at 256, 377 S.E.2d at 786.
194. Id.
195. Blalock, 12 N.C. App. 499, 183 S.E.2d 827.
196. Id. at 504, 183 S.E.2d at 830.
197. Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 249, 377 S.E.2d at 781.
198. Id. at 252, 377 S.E.2d at 783.
199. Id. at 253, 377 S.E.2d at 784.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 254, 377 S.E.2d at 784.
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ble time in which to leave work."20 2 Ms. Culpepper left work.203
She proceeded homeward.0 4 What is a reasonable time? Courts
have responded with numerous results. However, a reasonable time
appears to be that time it takes an employee to leave the work
area, get into his car, and drive off the employer's premises.20 5 Ms.
Culpepper finished work for the night.20 6 She drove off the resort
towards home.10 7 MS. Culpepper returned to the resort property
for a personal mission. She re-entered the employer's premises not
as an employee but rather as a visitor. No contractual duties of
employment governed her actions at the time she re-entered the
employer's premises.
It would be more likely, at the midnight hour, that the motor-
ist in the road was a stranger rather than a guest or potential
homebuyer. The sole motivation of Ms. Culpepper's stopping arose
out of her moral duty to render aid to that motorist. To hold oth-
erwise demonstrates an imaginative interpretation of the em-
ployer's instructions to its employee regarding cordiality to poten-
tial homebuyers. Futhermore, the court belittles or ignores
altogether Ms. Culpeppers' moral imperative to render aid to
another.
CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Court of Appeals held Ms. Culpepper's
injuries compensable. The decision in Culpepper creates precedent
contrary to the established case law for assault cases in the area of
Workers' Compensation. Holding that Ms. Culpepper's injuries
arose out of and in the course of employment defies the holdings in
Roberts and Gallimore. Roberts, traveling home from a business
trip, encountered a risk common to all who stop and render aid.
Gallimore's assault, a risk common to all, occured while in a mall
parking lot after work.
Assault is a risk common to all. This common risk, not her
employment duties, placed Ms. Culpepper in jeopardy. Assaults
202. Id. at 252, 377 S.E.2d at 783.
203. Id. at 244, 377 S.E.2d at 779.
204. Id. at 245, 377 S.E.2d at 779.
205. See generally Bass v. Mecklenburg County, 258 N.C. 226, 128 S.E.2d
570 (1962); Hardy v. Small, 246 N.C. 581, 99 S.E.2d 862 (1957) (employee injured
on only ingress and egress to and from the work he was to perform, therefore the
hazards of the route became the hazards of the employment).
206. Culpepper, 93 N.C. App. at 244, 377 S.E.2d at 779.
207. Id at 245, 377 S.E.2d at 779.
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should be, without more, accorded the benefit of injury by acci-
dent. However, when an employee departs work and travels home-
ward or deviates from her homeward journey on a personal mis-
sion, any good samaritan assistance to a third party should not
incur potential liability for the employer absent some special rela-
tionship with that third party.
Ms. Culpepper completed her employment duties. She left
work for the day. The assault, although on her employer's prop-
erty, fell outside the scope of her employment. Ms. Culpepper had
no legal duty to render aid to the motorist. Moral duty motivated
her to stop. The legislative intent of the Act does not encompass
injuries incurred outside the scope of employment. Furthermore,
the assault upon Ms. Culpepper, after she completed her work for
the day, was not a risk incident to the employment.
The court ignored the full commission's findings of fact. These
findings were supported by competent evidence in the record. Even
if the inferences support an alternative interpretation, the court
cannot reweigh the evidence in order to compensate a victim.
In effect, the North Carolina Court of Appeals expanded the
definition of injury to cover those injuries not contemplated under
the Workers' Compensation Act. Therefore, employees motivated
by the intentions of the Good Samaritan expose the employer to
uncontemplated potential liability when the employee decides to
render assistance to a third party. Awarding Ms. Culpepper com-
pensation under the Act thwarts public policy by encouraging em-
ployers to order employees not to render assistance to third parties
at any time.
The North Carolina Supreme Court will hear Culpepper v.
Fairfield Sapphire Valley in late 1989 or early 1990. The briefs
have been filed by the parties. Hopefully, the court will affirm its
previous position established in Roberts and Gallimore. A decision
by the supreme court allowing compensation to employees when
their acts do not arise out of and in the course of employment
would, in effect, remove those requirements from the Act.
Kathleen G. Sumner
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